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Abstract 
 
This study expands current understanding of the 
crowdfunding phenomenon by explaining how 
crowdfunding initiatives that have succeeded in 
hitting their financial target— referred to as 
crowdfunded projects— can continue to succeed by 
delivering their promise within the schedule, budget, 
and quality guidelines. The study develops 
propositions that elaborate the importance of 
undertaking four broad strategies—namely, project 
management, communication, community, and open 
innovation— during crowdfunded projects. It then 
reports the results of an in-depth, comparative 
qualitative study of two exemplary game 
development projects to evaluate the applicability of 
the propositions and create a better understanding of 
their underlying concepts. The findings confirm the 
propositions by demonstrating how the two projects 
differed greatly in the use of strategies. Furthermore, 
the exploratory nature of the comparisons enriches 
the propositions by revealing new concepts that need 
to be considered in the successful implementation of 
the identified strategies.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
In 1885, Joseph Pulitzer launched a crowdfunding 
campaign for the plinth that the Statue of Liberty still 
stands on today, by asking the readers of his 
newspaper The New York World for donations. Way 
back in 1713, a young Alexander Pope set out to 
translate 15,693 lines of Homer's Greek poetry into 
English. In exchange for being listed in the early 
edition of the book and the delight of helping to give 
birth to new creative work, 750 subscribers pledged 
two gold guineas to support Pope’s effort.  
Crowdfunding is not a new phenomenon. 
Throughout history, it has been trumpeted as a 
financial source of capital for those with influential 
ideas but limited resources to implement them [1-3]. 
However, it is relatively recently that advances in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) 
have allowed crowdfunding to enter, and even shape, 
the zeitgeist of modern entrepreneurship. 
Crowdfunding in its current form refers to open calls 
through Internet-based platforms such as Kickstarter 
and Indiegogo, asking a large number of dispersed 
individuals to contribute small amounts of money 
towards financing a specific project [4-7]. Existing 
research on crowdfunding provides a useful 
foundation to appreciate the complexities of building 
campaigns that can succeed in attracting financial 
support [6, 8-12]. Current discussions usually 
describe their understanding of the success of a 
crowdfunding initiative with measures, such as the 
rate of pledging to the funding target and the number 
of backers supporting the campaign [13-15]. The 
dominant research focus on how to succeed in raising 
funds is not surprising, given that acquiring financial 
resource is an impactful and well-documented event. 
Nonetheless, financing makes up just one facet of the 
longitudinal process that is expected to produce and 
deliver the promise of crowdfunding—usually a 
product or service [16, 17]. A successful 
crowdfunding campaign that has received sufficient 
financial support can still fail or produce poor 
outcomes by not being able to deliver its intended 
promise to backers within the schedule, budget, and 
quality guidelines. Alas, these outcomes are not 
uncommon. Research and industry reports agree that 
the life of crowdfunded projects is unpredictable, 
with at least half of new ventures failing within five 
years [18]. It is essential for the people who initiate a 
crowdfunding initiative— usually referred to as 
project owners—to think carefully about distinct 
challenges that their projects might face and consider 
strategic actions that can be implemented to help 
overcome or prevent those challenges.  
This study contributes to a better understanding 
of these dynamics by focusing on crowdfunding 
initiatives that have succeeded in hitting their 
financial target during the fundraising stage, 
asking:  How can they continue to succeed during 
the development stage, by delivering their promise 
within the schedule, budget, and quality 
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guidelines? The study draws upon extant research on 
organizational change [19] and crowdfunding to 
develop propositions that explain the importance of 
making certain strategic choices during crowdfunded 
projects. It then evaluates the applicability of the 
propositions by conducting a qualitative study that 
compares the exemplary cases of two game 
development projects—Shovel Knight and Clang— 
that had achieved incredible success in collecting 
financial support but had unfolded toward very 
different development fates.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
This section uses the socio-technical model of 
Leavitt [19] to create a narrative story that explains, 
and then ties together, strategic choices that can be 
considered during a crowdfunded project. Leavitt’s 
model has a long history of being used as a 
comprehensive and anchored in theory foundation for 
conceptualizing the critical aspects of product 
development [20]. Its application is consistent with 
the context of crowdfunded projects, aiming to 
advance a product or service. Leavitt’s model views 
product development as a multivariate system that 
involves structure, technology, people, and tasks [19, 
21].  Structure covers organizational and institutional 
setting issues of the project. Technology includes the 
application of tools, methods, and platforms used in 
the project. People refers to key stakeholders that are 
affected by the outcomes of the project, and hence 
they are expected to have a voice in the development 
process. Task represents the activities that need to be 
pursued to advance the project and benefit the 
development performance.   
 
2.1. Structure 
 
A crowdfunding initiative, which has been 
financially supported by the crowd, has found a 
chance to begin the development process towards 
implementing its promise. Managing crowdfunded 
projects, however, is challenging. Such challenge is 
partly due to common difficulties that crowdfunded 
projects share with other types of projects, i.e., 
project management risks, knowledge management 
risks [22, 23]. Additionally, crowdfunded projects 
have an extremely fluid and flexible nature that 
encourages overpromising and under-delivering, 
bringing uncertainty and confusion into their 
organizational structure [24]. For example, numerous 
high-profile controversies in the crowdfunding 
industry (e.g., Godus) have emerged as a result of 
reaching funding goals many times over, generating 
new expectations from backers to produce and 
distribute significantly more rewards (e.g., new layers 
functionalities in the final product). While it makes 
sense to use the extra funding to fulfill the new 
requirements, the relationship between available 
funding and capabilities of a team of entrepreneurs is 
not necessarily a linear one. Often, it can be the case 
that managing the increased complexity of a large 
project, regardless of the availability of funding, can 
be simply beyond the expectation, experience, and 
expertise of a small team of entrepreneurs. Similarly, 
crowdfunded projects are usually open to embrace 
inevitable changes in project direction (e.g., being 
acquired by established companies). However, 
conflict might arise if the emerging path of the 
project is very different from its original plans [25]. 
This can be particularly challenging due to the 
complexity of managing the expectations of a large 
and dispersed group of stakeholders— here, backers. 
Collectively, such situations can decrease backers’ 
satisfaction with their initial investment as well as 
their motivation in making subsequent contributions.  
Hence, crowdfunded projects need to place a 
strong emphasis on project management strategies 
that can strike a careful balance between the stability 
of plan-driven methods and the flexibility of agile 
development methods. Scrum, for example, applies 
iterative delivery and its principles to achieve such 
balance [23, 26]. It opens rooms for flexibility by 
allowing change requests to be created and approved 
at any time during the project. It also maintains 
stability by creating a prioritized development 
backlog and by making sure that all requirements 
related to an ongoing sprint are frozen during that 
sprint. Such process, which allows project owners to 
be open to change but also careful to avoid 
unnecessary complexity, increases the chance of 
implementing a project that meets not only the 
budget specifications and delivery timelines but also 
the quality requirements. Subsequently, a better 
development performance increases backers’ 
satisfaction with their investment and motives them 
to contribute to the project in the long run— both 
financially and intellectually.  We thus propose: 
Proposition 1. Hybrid project management 
strategies, which blend plan-driven and agile 
methods, increase the chance of meeting budget 
specifications, delivery timelines, and quality 
guidelines.  
Proposition 2. Hybrid project management 
strategies, which blend plan-driven and agile 
methods, increase backers’ satisfaction with their 
investment and the chance of making further 
contributions.   
  
Page 4994
2020 53th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
 
2.2. Technology 
 
A crowdfunded project that has not performed 
well in meeting the original plans can lead to 
collective losses of identity and self-esteem among 
backers [24]. The project, however, can still be 
considered successful if backers feel those changes in 
plans were inevitable and even necessary [27, 28]. 
Similarly, a project that has faced significant delay in 
delivery might still be considered successful if the 
final product or service finds its way to be adopted 
widely by the mass market [29]. Such examples 
suggest that crowdfunded projects are very likely to 
face problems in executing their plans. However, 
they can focus on using their platforms to engage in 
transparent communication with backers and the 
wider public to highlight and justify their 
development approaches and contributions. Such 
communication involves sharing frequent updates, 
but also informing backers about the underlying 
needs for change and explaining the importance of 
the ongoing development outcomes. It is also 
necessary to remain as responsive as possible [24] to 
foster trustworthy relationships with backers, reduce 
their anxiety in making sense of the value of their 
investment, and facilitate a hedonic experience for 
those that are most likely to be also the future users 
of the final product or service. We thus propose: 
Proposition 3. Frequent communication about 
the status of project and responsiveness to 
prospective users increase backers’ satisfaction with 
their investment.    
 
2.3. People 
 
During the development stage, project owners are 
very likely to sense new business opportunities for 
expanding their work and creating more profitable 
alternatives. For example, they might receive and 
respond to acquisition offers made by industry giants. 
Sometimes, it is necessary to embrace new 
opportunities not only for the sake of project owners’ 
career and their desire to expand their experience, but 
also for creating a sustainable future for the product 
they plan to develop via the crowdfunded project. 
New opportunities, however, bring the necessity of 
inevitable changes in the project, i.e., a shift from a 
non-for-profit to commercial product. If changes are 
not carefully articulated, they can decrease backers’ 
satisfaction with their investment and their 
motivation in making subsequent contributions. 
Hence, project owners should pay extra care to 
infusing the development stage with shared values to 
anchor and unite backers to the project. These efforts, 
in turn, help maintain a collective and sustainable 
identity for the project [24]. We thus suggest: 
Proposition 4. Reinforcement of shared values 
with the community of backers increases backers’ 
satisfaction with their investment and the chance of 
making further contributions.   
 
2.4. Task 
 
The flexible and fluid nature of crowdfunding 
initiatives, as discussed in the previous sections, can 
encourage project owners to commit to delivering a 
complex project that requires considerable 
knowledge, experience, and expertise—sometimes, 
far beyond than developers’ potential. This dilemma 
raises the question of how crowdfunded projects can 
compensate for their limitations in those important 
areas. One possibility is to outsource some aspects of 
development activities to the community of backers. 
This idea is supported by existing insights that 
suggest defining a co-investment model such as 
having skin in the project or receiving funding from 
external sources provide project owners with the 
flexibility to overcome unexpected challenges [30-
32]. Community involvement originates from the 
fundamental idea of open innovation research that 
suggests entrepreneurs can benefit from the 
innovative ideas and contributions of the future users 
of their offerings [27, 33]. For example, project 
owners can consult different groups of backers, with 
different financial contributions, to provide feedback 
and influence the prioritization of features 
development. Open innovation is beneficial at 
various levels. It reinforces engagement with future 
users, creates a sense of community in the process, 
and increases project owners’ productivity by 
allowing them to focus on the more critical tasks. For 
example, some forms of early access to the product 
before its official release allow project owners to 
leverage backers as committed functionality testers, 
who are willing to invest time and energy to examine 
usability assurance. At this point, it is important to 
empower backers with tools that help make voluntary 
contributions (e.g., social media features) and to 
publicly celebrate their contributions. Finally, open 
innovation encourages backers to visit project 
owners’ sites regularly. This, in turn, enhances online 
traffic and creates a community of people who are 
more likely to continue to make additional 
contributions along the way. Such involvement may 
also lead to higher levels of later satisfaction with the 
product or service. We thus formulate the following 
proposition:   
Proposition 5. Open innovation with 
prospective users who have provided financial 
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support during the fundraising stage increases both 
development performance and backers’ satisfaction 
of their investment.  
 
3. Research Method  
 
The study chooses a positivist case study 
approach [34, 35] to evaluate the applicability, and 
enhance understanding, of the propositions (P1-P5). 
The research design involves polar sampling [34, 36] 
to confirm or disconfirm emerging conceptual 
insights. Following Glaser and Strauss' [37] 
technique of theoretical sampling, the study considers 
two methodological choices.  
The first choice relates to selecting the context of 
game development as an insightful context for 
studying crowdfunded projects, having the potential 
to reveal new findings that are transferable to other 
contexts [38]. Game development is such a context 
because games— across all the major crowdfunding 
platforms— have proved to include extreme cases of 
popular and innovative, yet challenging to complete, 
projects [39].  
The second choice relates to selecting the cases of 
game development projects. Two exemplary cases— 
Shovel Knight and Clang— are selected for their 
similarities and differences to help replicate or extend 
the emergent theory. In terms of similarities, the 
selected games represent exemplary cases of two 
successful crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter. 
The first case, Shovel Knight, was a game launched 
by a small group of six software developers (Yacht 
Club) based in Los Angeles. The developers began 
by using Kickstarter in March 15, 2013 to raise funds 
($50,000) for developing and implementing the 
game. Within only a month, the crowdfunding 
campaign was successful in raising almost seven 
times more funds than initially expected ($330,000). 
The second case, Clang, was a game proposed by a 
Seattle-based science fiction author (Neal 
Stephenson). Stephenson generated the idea of Clang 
as a sword-fighting motion-sensing game to 
revolutionize sword fighting video games. He, and 
his team of developers, turned to Kickstarter in June 
9, 2012, making several professional and passionate 
videos and texts in order to raise funds for developing 
and implementing the game ($50,000). The highly 
successful campaign achieved half of the target goal 
in only 5 days. Within only a month, on July 9, 2012, 
the entire campaign was successful in raising almost 
10 times more funds (500,000). Next, differences 
were sought in their performance during the 
development stage, where the projects headed to 
entirely different directions and outcomes during the 
development stage. The one-year Shovel Knight 
project (April 2013-March 2014) faced a slight delay 
in delivery, but the team was able to convince 
backers and eventually release the game on June 28, 
2014. Shovel Knight captured the heart of its backers 
and turned out to be a shining success story in the 
gaming industry. Developers also went beyond 
delivering the game by creating complementary 
platforms and physical rewards such as soundtracks, 
art books, and DLCs (downloadable contents). 
Furthermore, the development of Shovel Knight is 
still gaining attention and developers have continued 
to make new releases, update their ongoing progress 
on the initial crowdfunding platform. For example, 
the latest update on the development of Shovel 
Knight on Kickstarter reads as in February 2019. The 
game, which landed on several Game of the Year 
lists, is widely known in the industry as an example 
of how to successfully both crowdfund and 
implement a crowdfunding initiative. In contrast, 
Clang— after publishing a series of updates by 
October 2013—went into a long one-year silence. On 
September 18, 2014, Stephenson wrote an update, but 
only announcing that the funds are not sufficient to 
advance Clang and that he is not able to attract 
additional investment to continue the development. 
While the update suggested that other upcoming 
projects might compensate backers’ losses in Clang, 
he mentioned that the team has suffered significant 
financial losses, because of consuming a considerable 
amount of time and money into the project.  
 
3.1. Data Collection 
 
The entire set of archival data about the 
development stages of the games were collected from 
their Kickstarter pages, including: their home page, 
and the existing tabs on campaign information, 
update, and comments. The data was collected using 
a web-crawler tool called Gooseeker. First, data in 
the campaigns’ information section described the 
idea of the crowdfunding initiatives and developers’ 
plan and vision. The researcher collected (1) 
measures (funding targets, minimum pledges, 
number of backers, project length), (2) texts (project 
descriptions, plans, risks, and team members), and (3) 
visual representations (videos made by project 
owners). Second, data in the updates tab mirrored 
developers’ description of their ongoing works and 
plans. The researcher also collected all the comments 
on each update (backers’ comments/ developers’ 
responses). Third, data in the comment tab reflected 
on backers’ reaction to developers’ updates as well as 
developers’ response to backers’ reactions. Table 1 
presents a summary of the data. The researcher 
entered all project updates and backers/project 
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owners’ comments and responses into a database in 
Nvivo indexed by case. 
Table 1. Data Collection 
# Shovel Knight Clang 
Timeline April 14, 2013- 
June 28, 2014  
(14 months) 
July 9, 2012- 
September 18, 
2014  
(26 months) 
Updates 48 20 
Comments 3323 1983 
 
3.2. Data Analysis 
 
Analysis within the positivist case study is 
generally focused toward deductive validation of 
theory using hypothetico-deductive logic and pattern 
matching [40]. While the propositions provided the 
baseline for the coding, the researcher engaged in 
deeper interpretations to reveal new concepts 
underlying the strategies [35]. She did not limit the 
analysis to using certain keywords to check the 
application of strategies during the development 
stages. Instead, she carefully read/observed and 
coded each piece of data to find evidence for the 
application of strategies. For example, for project 
management strategies (P1), she coded all the 
statements that point to how developers tried to meet 
budget specifications, delivery timelines, and quality 
guidelines (project management strategies). While 
several statements referred to ‘ongoing releases’ 
(agile method) as a way of advancing the game, 
others pointed to keywords such as ‘stretch goals’ 
and ‘product backlog’ (plan-driven method) for 
guiding the development process. Also, in terms of 
new concepts, some of the statements pointed to 
practical differences in how stretch goals were 
defined. Others reflected upon inherent 
entrepreneurial differences in how project owners 
perceived themselves and their commitment to 
completing the games. Similarly, for community 
strategies (P4), the researcher coded all the 
statements that point to how developers engaged in 
creating shared values across the community of 
backers. Some statements pointed to public calls 
inviting backers to contribute to the project (coded as 
community building efforts). Other statements 
demonstrated backers’ comments, requesting 
developers to release the open source code and allow 
for community contributions.  Such statements, 
coupled by observing developers silence in response 
to such requests, were coded as overlooking 
community building efforts. The results of the coding 
process for each project formed the basis of creating 
two tables that summarize the use of different 
strategies for each game. These tables, in turn, 
formed the basis of a cross-case analysis, relying on 
the methods suggested by Miles and Huberman [41] 
and Eisenhardt [42]. Cross-case comparison was 
essential to making sense of (1) how the project 
owners of Shovel Knight and Clang differed in using 
different strategies, and (2) how those differences 
might have been responsible for shaping their 
different development fates. The new understanding, 
in turn, was essential to evaluating the applicability 
of the propositions. The findings from the within-
case and cross-case analyses led to updating the 
propositions, as presented in the Discussion section.  
 
4. Results 
 
This section (1) explains how, and also sheds 
some lights on why, Shovel Knight and Clang 
differed in the use of project management, 
communication, community, and open innovation 
strategies, and (2) elaborate on how differences in the 
application of strategies led to different outcomes. 
 
4.1. Project Management Strategy 
 
Both Shovel Knight and Clang faced inevitable 
uncertainty in the project delivery. Both teams felt 
the tasks were far more substantial than they had 
initially thought, especially as a result of being 
overfunded and their obligation to be flexible and 
attend to additional rewards.  
The first difference, however, was in how they 
embraced hybrid strategies differently to minimize 
the potential occurrence of project management 
challenges. First, Shovel Knight team had asked 
initially for a humble amount of money for game 
development ($75k). Yet, developers had created a 
very detailed stretch goals strategy, in case they 
received more. The stretch goals seemed reasonable 
and, more importantly, consistent with their initial 
plan of development. For example, they included 
complimentary items such as developing music 
players, developing plus game, and developing 
Mac/Linux version. Hence, the stretch goals could 
form a guiding plan for their development than 
creating unexpected and unnecessary complexity. In 
other words, Shovel Knight team was very well 
aware of what they needed to do to make the project 
off the ground with the money from fundraising at 
the beginning of the project.  
In contrast, Clang team had defined ‘promising’ 
rewards that were focused on appealing to backers in 
the physical world, but not quite consistent with the 
development plan of the game, e.g., studio tour and 
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lunch with the team with pledge amount of 10,000$. 
In the final days of the project, backers attributed this 
lack of development guidance to Clang’s failing 
performance. On October 20, 2013, for example, 
Baja commented on one of the latest updates of 
Clang:  
“I believe that an outline of what is necessary for 
the game to be made is necessary, and stop 
hedging on hangups. Stick to the plan for the 
game. Create benchmarks, and stick to them. Set 
an expectation for response time, enemies, music 
tracks, and level of art within budget. Decide, 
commit, and then succeed. On the hardware side, 
don't shoot for perfection. Timetables are more 
important than perfection. Everything is open to 
infinite improvement always. Create the 
benchmarks early, and accomplish them.” 
The second difference was in how the two games 
differed in using project management strategies to 
address the similar challenges they both faced. 
Specifically, both Shovel Knight and Clang had a 
team of 5 to 6 team members. Upon being funded, 
the teams both realized that their game has turned out 
to be more complex than they initially thought. For 
example, Shovel Knight developers wrote: 
“We planned a game that was going to take five 
people more than a full work week (six if you 
count Jake) for two years ...  That kind of game 
simply is not possible on 328k.” 
The second key difference across the two games 
was the spirit of entrepreneurship in their project 
management style. Most notably, developers of 
Shovel Knight considered themselves as 
entrepreneurs who have previously developed only 
one game. This light spirit of entrepreneurship 
encouraged Shovel Knight developers to stretch their 
potential in overcoming project management 
challenges. It helped them to be happy to do what 
they call “broke ourselves.” For example, the team's 
key composer offered to take remuneration once the 
game was out to help with cutting the costs. The 
entire team also decided to postpone half of a year of 
the team's development time to the post-release stage. 
They wrote in a blogpost:  
"We ended up operating for five months without 
money or payments to the team here … It was a 
difficult period, where some of us were 
awkwardly standing in front of cashiers having 
our credit cards declined, drawing from any 
possible savings, and borrowing money from our 
friends and family. But we made it to the other 
side!" 
These tendencies, however, were not the case for 
Clang. The principal creator of Clang was a science 
fiction author, Neal Stephenson, who had co-founded 
a publishing company, Subutai Corporation, whose 
mission is to create games, graphic novels, and 
filmed entertainment based on Stephenson’s science 
fiction. Stephenson was bold in signaling to backers 
that Subutai Corporation is not a start up rather an 
established company. Hence, as an established 
company, he needs to provide reasonable salaries for 
the team members. Such style explains why Clang 
team was not ready to do what Shovel Knight was 
willing to embrace.  
 “[Subutai Corporation] is not a case of creating 
a startup company from scratch as part of a 
Kickstarter. This is, rather, a way for a pre-
established, albeit small, company to support a 
project it couldn't back out of its own resources. 
Our payroll processing company required a 
certain minimal "keep alive" payment to keep me 
on the books. This payment, a two-digit salary 
paid every two weeks, was split fifty-fifty between 
the CLANG and non-CLANG sides of the 
company's budget. Of course, salaried members 
of the CLANG team had to participate in 
fundraising activities too, but we felt we were 
striking an appropriate balance.” 
 
4.2. Communication Strategy 
 
Shovel Knight team shared various updates 
regarding their ongoing progress and remained 
highly responsive to backers’ questions and 
concerns. They never stopped updating backers 
and ongoing interactions with them. Out of 69 
updates, 50 updates were released after their 
successful fundraising campaign. They also 
responded in a reasonable time frame to backers’ 
comments and questions throughout the entire 
period of the project. Frequent updates signaled 
developers’ transparency and reassured to backers 
that the team is using the money appropriately to 
achieve the promises. Several backers commented 
on their appreciation of developers’ hard work and 
work ethics. Even when the project faced delay, 
developers continued to explain the reason. Some 
backers helped spread the message of developers 
by explaining the importance of some delay in 
eventually making a better product: 
“They are taking time to make sure 
games they sell aren't broken or affect 
consumers” 
This was not, however, the case in Clang. Out of 
43 updates, 22 were released before their successful 
fundraising campaign. In 2013, they stopped 
releasing updates for more than five months. After 
publishing only a series of few updates, the team 
went into a long one-year silence and left backers 
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wondering about the status of the project. This 
silence was followed by an update, announcing the 
failure of the project. Toward the end of the project, 
Clang team acknowledged that their communication 
approach with backers was not effective with 
statements such as “we simply can't share once and 
then bury ourselves in work again.” 
On top of these differences, the data draws 
attention to two additional differences in 
communication strategies. First, Shovel Knight team 
was very precise in describing the development plan 
to manage backers’ expectation. A backer noted: 
“Yacht Club Games was also very clear about 
their wording, ensuring that while they talked up 
the game, there was no misunderstanding what 
people should expect from the final product. 
Backers got what they were promised, everything 
was on time, and everyone was updated often 
enough to keep potential concerns at bay.” 
In contrast, Clang team did not remain committed 
to their initial promise, and they even provided 
misleading information throughout the development 
stage. For example, they released an update on 
February 22, 2013, signaling the development of a 
demo as the end result of the project. This update led 
to an immediate and strong reaction by backers. The 
following quote demonstrates a comment posted on 
the same day by a backer, who claimed to be 
developer himself and familiar with the norms of 
game development.  
“I think we all knew we were contributing to a 
game as much as a prototype for a larger game, 
but to call it a demo at this stage is a bit 
misleading I think. When the game is finished, I 
expect there to be some kind of functionality for 
player vs dummies/wood, player vs AI or player 
vs player.” 
Clang team responded by changing its statement 
and confirming that all backers will receive the full 
game. By April 2013, however, they posted 
additional updates that reinforced the idea of only 
developing a demo at the end of the development 
stage. On April 12, 2013, they responded to a backer 
who was disappointed of how the recent updates are 
adjusting expectations downward from the original 
planned scope.  
“Todd, sorry, but the plan for Kickstarter was 
never a full game, though many read it that way, 
which is why we are attempting to adjust 
expectations.” 
Second, unlike Shovel Knight’s clear, attentive 
and friendly tone of response that sympathized with 
users at the time of crisis (e.g., project delay), Clang 
team framed its updates and responses to backers in 
ways that disturbed people, and eventually led to an 
apology from Stephenson and developers. For 
example, Stephenson wrote an update on September 
19, 2013, suggesting that half a million collected 
from the campaign was only enough for creating a 
prototype to be used to attract future investments. 
Similarly, he referred to the project as a “huge waste” 
of his time. Backers responded with comments that 
express their disappointment with the tone of the 
communication.  
“I am disappointed - not only in the apparent 
failing of this Kickstarter, but with the tone of the 
latest update and its terrible delivery to its 
backers.” “But the wording of this latest update 
leaves a REALLY sour aftertaste.” 
Stephenson responded by apologizing for poor 
communication. However, his response exacerbated 
the disappointment as well. For example, he 
suggested that it was developers who got him 
involved in the fundraising process as a way to move 
their idea of the game forward. A backer called 
Lafazer noted on September 21, 2013: 
“This latest update has none of that and instead 
is full of whining and trying really hard to shift 
blame on anyone except Subutai. All you had to 
say was "We were in over our head", "We 
miscalculated/underestimated the cost/time", etc 
and I would have understood and had no problem 
with that.” 
 
4.3. Community Strategy 
 
The idea of Shovel Knight revolved around 
creating a platform-based game that sustains itself 
over time. Developers undertook innovative 
community building activities to reiterate how 
their vision aligns with the vision of backers. For 
example, they invited backers to contribute to the 
game by creating digital avatars. Subsequently, 
they established digital galleries and encouraged 
backers to vote. In contrast, Clang team did little 
to reinforce shared values, even at the time of 
facing a crisis. This was a lost opportunity 
because it could have helped make a positive 
impression of backers. Furthermore, developers 
dismissed valuable community building 
opportunities that experienced backers— who 
were interested in the future of Clang— 
suggested. For example, some experienced 
backers responded to developers’ frustration by 
asking for at least minimal features. Other 
backers understood the failing signal of the game 
but encouraged developers to share the code so 
that people can stay in touch and collectively 
build on it in the future. In response to all of such 
suggestions, Clang developers remained silent, 
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missing opportunities to leverage their incredible 
community to build on Clang. As an example, a 
backer wrote on September 19, 2014: 
 ‘If you're not going to release it soon, can we 
get at least some more gameplay videos?’, ‘I 
understand the delay of the game for testing 
but if it has been submitted then the 
soundtrack would be done, right?’, “I'm 
going to echo people here and call for open 
sourcing the code and creative commons 
licensing the art.” 
 
4.4. Open Innovation Strategy 
 
The data suggests a clear difference between 
Shovel Knight and Clang in their use of open 
innovation strategy.  Right after being funded, Shovel 
Knight team began to encourage backers to 
participate in the project by, for example, providing 
burning suggestions, voting on emerging game 
characters, and sharing their own representations of 
the game and the characters (e.g., 3D, printed). On 
October 1, 2013, developers updated their platform: 
 “Check your emails, backers… you should have 
received a poll to choose your favorite playable 
bosses. There are also some survey questions on 
there that we thought you might have fun 
answering too!”  
Once again, Clang team did limited work to 
practice collaboration with backers. Most notably, 
developers did not invite backers to contribute to the 
project in any major form, as it was the case for 
Shovel Knight. Indeed, they could benefit from an 
open innovation strategy that involved experienced 
backers in development. Instead, developers were 
direct in highlighting that backers cannot help except 
by providing more financial investment and by 
remaining patient until developers find a solution for 
the problem. This was a very different style of 
involving the community to contribute to the project. 
On September 19, 2013, Clang developers wrote: 
“What can people do to help? Probably not that 
much, unless they happen to be qualified 
investors or superstar game programmers 
looking for an adventure. Be patient. We always 
knew that this was going to take a while and that 
we'd hit some bumps along the way.”  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Despite the presence of numerous inroads by 
researchers into explaining how crowdfunding 
campaigns may succeed in attracting funds [43, 44], 
important issues that correspond to the development 
stage of crowdfunded projects remain largely 
unexplored [16]. This lack of attention is 
disappointing because of several examples of 
crowdfunding campaigns that, despite strong social 
and capital support, have not managed to establish 
themselves as successful initiatives [24]. 
Motivated by this gap, the present study is 
undertaken with appreciating the need to shift the 
dominant focus of the crowdfunding literature from a 
variance-based approach that is concerned with 
understanding the antecedents of successful 
fundraising to illuminating the complexities that 
underlie the execution of crowdfunded projects. 
Using Leavitt’s [19] socio-technical model, the study 
discusses some of the distinct features and 
complexities of crowdfunded projects— compared to 
general projects [22, 23]. This discussion is followed 
by formulating broad propositions to draw attention 
to the role of four strategies—namely, project 
management, communication, community, and open 
innovation— in managing crowdfunded projects. The 
article reports the results of an in-depth, exploratory 
study of two contrasting crowdfunded projects. The 
findings demonstrate distinct differences in the use of 
the identified strategies, confirming the applicability 
of the propositions. Furthermore, in-depth 
investigation into the manifestation of the strategies 
helped reveals new concepts that should be 
considered for the successful implementation of 
strategies. Taken together, Table 2 summarizes the 
final propositions that can be used in future research. 
The table highlights the revised concepts (P1-P3). It 
is useful to consider that project owners can prepare 
for the execution of these strategies as early as 
running the fundraising campaign. For example, they 
can define detailed stretch goals, create a strong sense 
of entrepreneurship among team members, and 
consider open innovation plans to identify whether 
and how they would like to collaborate with backers 
during the development stage.  
Table 2. Theoretical Propositions  
Revised Propositions 
Project M
anagem
ent 
 
P1. Project management strategies that (1.1) 
blend plan-driven and agile methods, (1.2) 
include a detailed list of stretch goals that 
are reasonable and consistent with the 
plan of development, and (1.3) embrace 
the spirit of entrepreneurship increase the 
chance of meeting budget specifications, 
delivery timelines, and quality guidelines.  
P2. Project management strategies, as 
described above, increase backers’ 
satisfaction with their investment and the 
chance of making further contributions.   
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C
om
m
unication 
P3. Communication strategies that (3.1) 
involve frequent updates about project 
status, (3.2) emphasize responsiveness to 
prospective users, (3.3) create consistency 
in signaling plans for the project, and 
(3.4) practice optimism and respect to 
backers increase backers’ satisfaction with 
their investment.    
C
om
m
unit
y 
P 4. Reinforcement of shared values with the 
community of backers increases backers’ 
satisfaction with their investment and the 
chance of making further contributions. 
O
pen 
Innovation 
P5. Open innovation with prospective users 
who have provided financial support during 
the fundraising stage increases both 
development performance and backers’ 
satisfaction of their investment.  
It is also critical to exercise caution in the 
application of strategies, as they might lead to 
unintended and unpredicted consequences. For 
example, close collaboration with the crowd is 
expected to benefit project implementation processes. 
However, openness to different perspectives and 
requirements has the potential to increase the 
complexity of the project [45], create conflict and 
loss of interest among stakeholders, and distract team 
members from their key responsibility— that is, 
development. 
 
6. Future Research 
The theoretical implications are developed 
through a two-step process of proposition 
development and empirical evaluation using the case 
of two contrasting game development projects. 
Future studies are welcomed to use the propositions 
and evaluate their applicability in larger datasets. 
Qualitative investigations are particularly encouraged 
to reveal additional dimensions that underlie each of 
the strategies. For example, researchers may observe 
new patterns of community building and open 
innovation and reflect upon their observations in the 
propositions (P4-P5). Finally, this study evaluated the 
propositions using the cases of two game 
development projects. It would be very interesting to 
expand our understanding of the propositions by 
delving into new categories of crowdfunded projects 
such as hardware development.  
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